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Abstract
This paper reports results of an experiment designed to analyze the link between risky decisions
made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each spouse. We estimate both the spouses
and the couples’ degrees of risk aversion, we assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses
aggregate when they make risky decisions and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision
process that takes place when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being fixed,
the balance of power within the household is malleable. In most couples, men have, initially, more
decision-making power than women but women who ultimately implement the joint decisions gain
more and more power over the course of decision making.
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1 Introduction
Almost every important economic decision involves risk and a substantial body of research investigates
how individuals incorporate risk into their decision process. In this body of literature, only a tiny
portion is devoted to the study of household decision-making under risk. However, in many day-to-
day life contexts such as financial investments, insurance, retirement plans, or residential location, the
decisions have consequences at the household level rather than at the individual level. These decisions
are (or should be) made jointly. Even when these decisions are formally made by only one member of
the household, they may modify (and/or can be modified by) other decisions in the household.
A growing literature in economics shows that household savings and financial investments are
significantly affected by how decision-making power is allocated between men and women.1 This
empirical work observes household outcomes and changes in members’ incomes to draw conclusions
about underlying gender preferences. As argued below, we strongly believe that this evidence should
be interpreted with caution and that such empirical results are not necessarily reflective of intrinsic or
immutable preference differences between women and men. In order to identify the link between risky
decisions made by couples and risky decisions made separately by each spouse, we use an experimental
approach. We observe intra-household financial decisions in an artefactual field experiment.2 Our
experiment was explicitly designed to investigate the decision process that takes place when couples
make risky decisions.3
Until recently, household decisions were treated in the standard neoclassical framework of economic
theory. This approach corresponds to the unitary model, which involves a unique decision-maker rep-
resenting the household. From a methodological point of view, unitary models are opened to criticism,
since they hide the divergences of interest that may arise among household members. Unitary models
implicitly assume that the household’s members pursue consensual objectives. However, individual
preferences cannot be easily aggregated. As pointed out by Chiappori (1988), joint decision making
has a different meaning within a couple than in other contexts such as professional interactions. A poor
understanding of decision mechanisms (and therefore, of resources allocation within the household)
may introduce biases at the descriptive level (interpretation of empirical results) and at the normative
level (optimal taxation of households). Further emphasis on the bargaining process in which men and
women interact can shed greater light on how individual incomes turn into household outcomes.
The main differences between couples (or more generally families) and other groups are that (i)
a large degree of altruism usually takes place within the couple, and (ii) spouses usually have more
occasions and willingness to share information. In riskless situations, Chiappori (1988) assumes that
the utility of a family is a weighted average of the utilities of its members; the (endogenous) weights
depend on all individual characteristics and reflect the respective bargaining powers of each member
1For example, income given to women is more likely to be used for investments in education and housing than income
given to men (Duflo, 2003).
2An artefactual field experiment is identical to a typical laboratory experiment but one which makes use of a non-
standard subject pool (see the terminology of Harrison and List, 2004).
3Though there exists copious experimental evidence on how individuals choose, there has been very little experimental
investigation into how households or couples make their decisions. Bateman and Munro (2005) presents results of an
experiment designed to investigate the extent to which decisions made by couples and decisions made separately by
spouses are consistent with the axioms of Expected Utility Theory (EUT). They find that choices made by couples
exhibit the same kinds of patterns (e.g. the common ratio and common consequence effects) as are regularly recorded
with individuals. Bateman and Munro (2009) reports on a choice experiment using reductions in dietary health risks as
the vehicle. In one treatment a random individual is chosen from the couple and takes part in a face-to-face interview;
in the other treatment, both partners are asked questions jointly, again in a face-to-face interview. They find significant
differences in the values elicited in the two treatments, and the values elicited from couples are not a simple average of
those elicited from men and women.
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in the household. Chiappori’s approach amounts to assume that the negotiation leads to a Pareto-
optimal solution, which is consistent with any efficient negotiation process. The weights of each
spouse’s utility are then called Pareto weights. If the Pareto weights are constant (i.e. do not depend
on any individual or family characteristics such as wages or individual wealths) then the family can be
represented by a single standard utility function. This corresponds to the (above mentioned) unitary
approach, which ignores the various decision-making processes and transactions occurring among the
household members. Unitary models imply the income pooling condition: Decisions made by the
family should not be affected by the source of income or wealth.
On the other hand, if the Pareto weights are not constant then bargaining powers change with
individual wages or wealths. In this case, there is no simple and intuitive relation between the spouses’
and the couple risk aversions. Income pooling has been repeatedly rejected empirically in different cul-
tural contexts (Vermeulen, 2002). Therefore, more and more studies (both theoretical and empirical)
concerned with couple decisions in a deterministic environment are now written within the collective
framework (a` la Chiappori).
When risk dimensions are involved in the decision process, most of the literature still relies on
the unitary approach. Among the very few exceptions is Mazzocco (2004) which shows that, in a
collective model, an increase in the degree of risk aversion of one household member may induce the
household to take more risk (see also Donni, 2003). This counter-intuitive phenomenon results from
the opposing impacts of individual degrees of risk aversion on individual decisions and Pareto weights.
Indeed, the Households Retirement Survey data show that the risk aversion of couples in which the
woman’s risk aversion is very high, is a U−shaped function of the man’s risk aversion.
This paper reports on an experimental test of couple decision-making under risk. Couples are
presented with tasks involving binary choices between a lottery and a sure payoff. In the first part of
the experiment spouses are separated and choose independently. In the second part of the experiment
male spouses rejoin their partner and they make joint decisions. Couples are video-recorded while
interacting and discussing in order to make joint decisions. We estimate both the spouses and the
couples’ degrees of risk aversion, we assess how the risk preferences of the two spouses aggregate when
they make risky decisions and we shed light on the dynamics of the decision process that takes place
when couples make risky decisions. We find that, far from being fixed, the balance of power within
the household is malleable. In most couples, men have, initially, more decision-making power than
women but women who ultimately implement the joint decisions gain more and more power over the
course of decision making.
The road map of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental design. In Section 3,
we first provide ordinal measures of couples and spouses risk aversion and then we investigate the
dynamics of power balance using discrete choice models techniques. A quantitative analysis of the
couples discussions is provided in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental design
We elicited measures of risk aversion by means of choice bracketing procedures, also referred to as
investment series. In each step of the bracketing procedure, the decision maker (either an individual
or a couple) had to choose between a safe and a risky alternative. Risky alternatives were simple
monetary lotteries, modeling the toss of a fair coin, i.e., yielding a low (respectively high) payoff with
probability 1/2. Potential payoffs and probabilities were always known to the decision makers and, in
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a given bracketing procedure, the safe alternative was a sure amount ranging from the low outcome
of the lottery to the high outcome of the lottery. At the end of the experimental session, one of the
steps was randomly selected for payoff, and the decision maker’s chosen option was then played out
as the reward.4 All details concerning the bracketing procedures and the lotteries are to be found in
the supplementary material.5
Our elicitation method has two main advantages: First, we expect it to provide reliable estimates
of risk aversion due to the simplicity of the task and the transparency of the incentives to respond
truthfully; Second, it enables us to directly infer a risk attitude from the pattern of the decision
maker’s responses in a given investment series (see Section 3.1). The main disadvantage of our elic-
itation instrument is that it cannot be used to make inferences about non-EUT models of choice
behavior. Since we restrict probabilities to 1/2, we cannot use the decision maker’s responses to make
inferences about probability weighting, which plays a major role in rank-dependent alternatives to
EUT. Consequently, we default to thinking of risk attitudes as synonymous with the properties of the
utility function, consistent with traditional EUT representations.
2.1 Experimental sessions and participants
Seven experimental sessions were carried out from January 2005 to February 2005. Subjects were
recruited from the city of Jena (Germany) via local newspaper advertisements, through community
groups and using posters in the city center. Session sizes varied from 2 to 4 couples and were held
at the experimental economics video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena.
In recruiting, we required all individuals to be over 30, to be living with their partners and to have
been together as a couple for at least one year. We recruited 22 couples for our experiment. They
answered to a total of 3828 lotteries (either individually or with their spouse). At the beginning of
the experiment, we asked a few warm-up questions to the spouses separately about themselves and
about the couple (see step 1 of section 1 in the experimental procedures sum-up below). The main
characteristics are briefly summarized now.
Average payoffs were just above 50 e per individual—more than five times the median hourly
post-tax wage for an adult working in the former East Germany in 2005. Ages ranged from 21 to 64,
with a mean of 43.6 Approximately 73% of individuals stated that they were married to their current
partner and all the couples in our sample were heterosexual. On average, couples had been together
for 15 years (median of 17), with a maximum of 42 and a minimum of less than 1.7 Interestingly, the
union duration stated by women is on average 1 year more than the duration stated by men, with
a maximum difference of 12 years. This difference may be explained by the fact that the man only
considered marriage duration, whereas the woman considered the total duration, including the period
they were living together before they got married. On average, couples had 1.3 children together.
In addition, the women (men) had on average 0.3 (respectively 0.5) children from previous union(s).
4The random lottery incentive system avoids income and house money effects, and it has become the almost exclusively
used incentive system in individual decision-making experimental studies today. Holt (1986) argued that if subjects do
not separate each task under this incentive system, it would lead them to a different behavior from that in a single-shot
task. However, several experimental studies demonstrate that the random lottery incentive system induces an almost
identical behavior to that in a single-shot task (Starmer and Sugden, 1991; Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden, 1998; Hey and
Lee, 2005).
5Our elicitation method is remotely related to the Random Lottery Pairs design which has been generally used to
test the predictions of EUT (see, among others, Hey and Orme, 1994). The main differences are that probabilities were
always equal to 1/2 in our design and one of the two alternatives was a safe option.
6One couple was below the required age of 30 years. Both were students aged 21-22.
7Only the couple of students had a union duration of less than one year.
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These figures are quite representative of the German population (see Lechner, 2001).
2.2 Progress of an experimental session
Before entering the video laboratory, couples were reminded that decisions would be implemented on
computers (this information had already been provided in the invitation mail) and they were told
that they could ask for help at any point in time during the experimental session. Couples were
also informed that the session would take place in a video laboratory and that part of the session
would be video-recorded.8 Finally, it was mentioned to the couples that the session would consist of
several parts (no details concerning the different parts were provided at that point of time) and that
instructions for each part would be delivered in due time.
Upon entering the video laboratory, couples were separated: each male entered one of the odd
numbered cabins and each female entered one of the even numbered cabins.9 The experiment involved
two sections. The first section was conducted with the two spouses located in different cabins; pairs
then rejoined each other for the second section.
The first section of the experiment started with the elicitation of the participants’ socioeconomic
characteristics (level of education, post-tax monthly salary, etc.). Next, the separated subjects had
to estimate their influence on the couple decision in every day life situations. After answering this
questionnaire, each subject was endowed with 40 e. Finally, the separated subjects went through
six investment series: in the first three series, separated subjects had to invest part or all of their
own endowment into risky options, whereas during the last three series each subject had to invest
part or all of the couple endowment into risky options. Before going through the six series of risky
investments, subjects were told that they would have to go through twelve investment series and that
each of their answers could possibly determine their payoff.10 The subjects were given details of how
the payout procedures would operate only at the end of the experiment.
In the second section of the experiment, couples made choices jointly and this section has been
video-recorded. Male spouses were asked to join their female partners in their cabin and choices were
made on the computer previously used by the female spouse. Couples went through six investment
series. They had the possibility to discuss but no specific instructions as to how the couple decisions
should be made were provided (and no explicit time limit was given). Most couples went through
the six series of risky investments in less than 15 minutes, which indicates that agreements were
quite easily reached. Except for five couples, the female spouse always physically entered the couple
decisions into the computer. It is rather unsurprising that in most cases women implemented the
couple decisions since the second section of the experiment took place in the women cabins and couple
decisions were made on the same computers women used to make their individual decisions.11 Though
the assignment of the mouse is not induced experimentally,12 our experimental design clearly favors
8Couples were also told that if they did not feel like being recorded then they could leave immediately and that they
would get a compensation of 20 e per person. All couples decided to stay and take part in the experiment.
9The experimental economics video laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics in Jena comprises 8 sound-
proof cabins. Each cabin provides in- and output for video- and audio signals. In addition, each cabin is equipped with
a personal computer. See Baumann and Schmidt (2004) for details.
10Payoff-relevant investments were preceded by a training series of ten investments.
11The likelihood that the man implements the couple decisions increases with the income difference between the two
spouses. In the 5 couples in which the man holds the mouse, the average income difference is 3.8 categories. The average
income difference is only 1.23 categories in the 17 couples in which the woman holds the mouse. This difference is
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. Additionally, men who hold the mouse are on average 0.4 levels more
educated than their wives and women who hold the mouse are on average 0.47 levels more educated than their husbands.
This difference is not statistically significant (p-value > 0.1).
12Given the nature of our subject pool, we feared that the assignment of the mouse to a specific spouse would be a
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women over men for the control of the mouse.
The incentive system was a follows. In the beginning, one of the two spouses had to randomly
draw a card from a pile of five cards, one card being numbered one, two cards being numbered two,
and two cards being numbered three. If the card numbered one was randomly drawn then the payoff-
relevant decision was determined separately for each spouse. Indeed, the payoff-relevant decision for
each spouse was randomly selected among the decisions in which the spouse invested part or all of
his/her endowment. The male spouse went back to his cabin and each spouse’s paid decision was
determined according to two random draws, one random draw to determine the series (series 1, 2 or
3) and the other random draw to determine which decision in the series. If a card numbered two was
randomly drawn then the payoff-relevant decision for the couple was determined. First, a random
draw decided whether one of the female or one of the male decisions to invest the couple endowment
would be paid, and second, two additional random draws were made in order to select the series (series
4, 5 or 6) and the decision in the randomly selected series. If a card numbered three was randomly
drawn then the payoff-relevant decision for the couple was determined. Two random draws were made
in order to select the series (series 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 or 12) and the decision in the randomly selected
series.
Our payoff scheme incentivizes subjects to truly reveal their individual preferences in the first part
of the experiment unless spouses expect their choices to be undone later at home and/or spouses try
to efficiently coordinate their choices with each other. The first possibility is a natural consequence
of the fact that our subjects have an ongoing relationship with each other which implies that choices
made during the experiment can be undone when spouses go home. Any experimental study on intra-
household decision making suffers from this weakness and we do not know of a satisfactory procedure
to handle it. Still, we observe that in all cases where spouses collected money from having invested
their personal endowment, earnings were placed in individual wallets immediately after payment (in
those cases, spouses were paid in private and not informed about each other earnings).13 Though this
evidence is not fully convincing, it suggests the absence of binding agreements on individual earnings.
The second possibility relates to the fact that individual incentives in the first three investment series
differ, at least theoretically, from those in the next three investment series. Spouses might choose
more risky options in investment series 1, 2 and 3 than in investment series 4, 5 and 6 as a result of
coordination attempts with their partner since only personal endowments are invested. It seems rather
unlikely that such coordination attempts took place. Indeed, spouses were in separate soundproof
cabins in the first section of the experiment without knowing the decision tasks faced by their partner.
More importantly, details of how the payout procedures operate were provided only at the end of the
experiment. Before the start of the experiment, subjects were only told that each of their choices
could possibly determine their payoff.
The computer screens that subjects saw while going through the two sections of the experiment
have been translated (see the supplementary material). Additional material of the experimental
sessions, like the written instructions and the payment procedures, is available upon request from
the authors. Below, we summarize our experimental procedures.
rather intrusive procedure. In a follow-up study, we investigate an alternative procedure in which both spouses enter the
couple decisions into the computer.
13On the other hand, when spouses earnings were derived from investments of the couple endowment, one spouse
always collected the joint earnings as a result of mutual consent even though these earnings had been divided by the
experimenters into two equal shares.
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Experimental procedures
Section 1 of the experiment: Spouses are separated
In step 1, each spouse is asked to answer questions concerning his/her personal characteristics as well as
concerning the couple characteristics. In the last three steps, each spouse goes through several investment
series. In each series, the spouse has to invest a certain amount of money either in a lottery, modeling the
toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoff. Sure payoffs range from the low outcome of the lottery to the high
outcome of the lottery.
• Step 1. Characteristics of the individual/couple: First, each spouse is asked to answer questions
concerning his/her personal characteristics (age, job status, etc.). Second, each spouse is asked to answer
questions concerning his/her financial status (income, real estate, etc.). Finally, the decision-making power
of each spouse in some of the couple decisions is elicited.
After answering all the questions, each spouse collects 40 e as a reward.
• Step 2. Training investment series: Each spouse goes through an investment series which is not
payoff-relevant. Each investment decision consists in investing 50 e.
• Step 3. Investment series 1, 2, and 3: Each spouse goes through three payoff-relevant investment
series. In the first series, each spouse invests 20 out of the 40 e he/she collected. In the second and third
series, each spouse invests the entire 40 e.
• Step 4. Investment series 4, 5, and 6: Each spouse goes through three payoff-relevant investment
series. In the first series, each spouse invests 40 out of the 80 e the couple collected. In the second and
third series, each spouse invests the entire 80 e.
Section 2 of the experiment: Spouses are together
In step 5, the couple goes through three investment series. In each series, the couple has to invest a certain
amount of money either in a lottery, modeling the toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoff. Sure payoffs range
from the low outcome of the lottery to the high outcome of the lottery. In step 6, the couple goes through
three investment series, including 3 questions each. In each series, the couple has to invest a certain amount
of money either in a lottery (specific to each question), modeling the toss of a fair coin, or in a sure payoff
(which does not vary within a series). In each series, the lottery proposed in the second question depends
on the answer to the first question, and the lottery proposed in the third question depends on the answer
to the first and second questions.
• Step 5. Investment series 7, 8, and 9: The couple goes through three payoff-relevant investment
series. In the first series, the couple invests 40 out of the 80 e the couple collected. In the second and third
series, the couple invests the entire 80 e. The figures in series 7 (respectively 8, 9) are exactly the same as
the ones in series 4 (respectively 5, 6).
• Step 6. Investment series 10, 11 and 12: Both the amount invested and the sure payoff are 80 e. In
the first series, the couple may loose half of the 80 e in the worst case and increase their payoff up to 140 e
in the best case. The expected payoff of all lotteries is 90 e, and the variability of the payoff is increased if
the couple previously selected the lottery, decreased if they previously selected the sure payoff. The second
series is similar, except that the safe payoff is 90 e (all amounts in the first question are increased by 10
e). In the third series, there is no risk of any loss (the payoff in the worst case is 80 e), and instead of
increasing/decreasing the variance, only one outcome is increased/decreased depending on the answer to the
previous question.
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3 Results
In this section, we first assess the decision makers degrees of risk aversion by relying on an ordinal
approach. We restrict ourselves to the choices made by the spouses separately in investment series 4
to 6 (Step 4), and to the choices made by the couples in investment series 7 to 9 (Step 5). Indeed, in
investment series 4 (respectively 5 and 6) each spouse is assigned to the same lottery, and this lottery
is also the one used in investment series 7 (respectively 8 and 9) when both spouses decide jointly.
Therefore, the individual and couple answers can be compared directly. Second, we rely on a cardinal
approach and we assume that spouses are expected utility maximizers with a constant absolute risk
aversion utility function. We use individual choices in investment series 1 to 6 and joint choices in
investment series 7 to 12 to study the evolution of the balance of decision-making power within the
household. Both in the cardinal and in the ordinal approach, we allow the choices to violate the
assumption that preferences are monotonic with respect to money.
3.1 Man, woman and couple risk attitudes
In each investment series j, the decision maker faces 11 choices (i = 1, ..., 11) between a lottery Lj
and a sure payoff Sj(i). The lottery yields the low payoff Sj(11) and the high payoff Sj(1) with
equal probabilities. The sequence of sure payoffs is given by Sj(i) = Sj(11) +
(
11−i
10
)
(Sj(1)− Sj(11)),
i = 1, . . . , 11. Since the expected value of the lottery equals Sj(6), a risk-neutral decision maker is
indifferent between the lottery and Sj(6).
The set of choices made by a decision maker facing investment series j is inconsistent if monotonic
and transitive preferences cannot rationalize those choices. Table 1 shows, for each investment series,
the relative frequency of inconsistent sets of choices for women, men and couples. Overall, there were
23% (respectively 13% and 9%) of inconsistent sets of choices for women (respectively for men and
for couples). Most of the women inconsistent sets of choices were made in the early investment series
which suggests that women need more than one training investment series in order to get acquainted
with the task.14
Investment series Woman Man Couple
1 (Woman & Man) 9/22 2/22
2 (Woman & Man) 7/22 3/22
3 (Woman & Man) 6/22 3/22
4 (Woman & Man) / 7 (Couple) 2/22 3/22 2/22
5 (Woman & Man) / 8 (Couple) 2/22 2/22 1/22
6 (Woman & Man) / 9 (Couple) 4/22 4/22 3/22
Table 1: Relative frequencies of inconsistent series of choice.
A consistent set of choices is characterized by a unique switching point, i ∈ {0, ..., 11}: for a given
14Given the nature of our risk elicitation mechanism and subject pool, the amount of inconsistencies observed is
rather low. Experimental studies which have employed a Multiple Price List (MPL) risk elicitation mechanism report a
proportion of inconsistent preferences usually larger than 10%. Among others, both Eckel and Wilson (2004) and Holt
and Laury (2002) report 13% of inconsistent preferences (this proportion drops to 5.5% when payoffs are scaled by a
factor of 50 or 90 in the latter study), and Bruner, McKee, and Santore (2008) report 20% of inconsistent preferences.
Note that these studies used college students as experimental subjects (who are generally quick on understanding their
task in the experiment) and that the MPL mechanism allows subjects to see all choices in one frame which might lead
them to make more consistent choices than they would otherwise (but seems to induce a framing effect).
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investment series j, decision maker k in class i prefers lottery Lj to all deterministic amounts lower
than or equal to Sj(i+ 1) and prefers all amounts larger than or equal to Sj(i) to lottery Lj . In this
case, we denote by k the risk preference relation of decision maker k, uniquely defined on the set
{Lj , Sj(i), i = 1, ..., 11} by his/her set of replies to series j. More specifically, Sj(i) k Lj means that
decision maker k prefers the sure payoff Sj(i) to the lottery Lj . Given the construction of the series,
the classes are ranked by increasing risk aversion, which defines an ordinal measure of risk aversion.
Out of the 211 potential sets of choices in a given investment series, only 12 are consistent, which
defines 12 ordered classes of risk aversion. They are represented in Table 2, together with the frequen-
cies of observed answers in each series, for women, men, and couples.
Switching Set of Investment series: Woman, Man; Couple
point consistent choices 1 2 3 4;7 5;8 6;9
0 Lj k Sj(1) 1,0
1 Sj(1) k Lj k Sj(2)
2 Sj(2) k Lj k Sj(3)
3 Sj(3) k Lj k Sj(4) 1,1
4 Sj(4) k Lj k Sj(5) 0,1 0,1 0,1 1,0;0 1,0;0
5 Sj(5) k Lj k Sj(6) 0,3 1,2 5,1 1,1;2 1,1;2 0,0;1
6 Sj(6) k Lj k Sj(7) 5,7 1,3 6,8 4,7;6 4,6;2 6,7;5
7 Sj(7) k Lj k Sj(8) 1,0 2,6 1,3 4,5;4 5,3;0 4,3;4
8 Sj(8) k Lj k Sj(9) 3,5 5,3 1,4 5,2;7 2,6;13 3,4;5
9 Sj(9) k Lj k Sj(10) 2,3 0,1 2,2;1 2,2;4 0,1;4
10 Sj(10) k Lj k Sj(11) 1,0 2,0 1,1 0,1;0 2,1;0 1,1;0
11 Sj(11) k Lj (Lj −OR) 1,3 2,1 2,0 3,1;0 3,1;0 4,2;0
Table 2: The 12 sets of consistent choices.
We observe that a significant proportion of individuals (especially women) are willing to receive
always less money just for the benefit of avoiding any risk (15 out of 22 ∗ 6 women-series and 8 out
of 22 ∗ 6 men-series). We denote by Locally Opposed to Risk for lottery Lj (Lj−OR), those decision
makers who consistently prefer any sure payoff Sj(i), i = 1, . . . , 11, to lottery Lj in investment series
j. Lj−OR preferences are never shared by both spouses in a couple nor by the two spouses together,
i.e., no Lj−OR individual was able to convince his/her spouse. We observe that only one respondent
(a female respondent) is Lj−OR for the 6 series Lj , j = 1, . . . , 6 which implies an infinite level of risk
aversion.
To take into account inconsistent sets of choices, the total number of “safe” choices is used as an
indicator of risk aversion: For a given investment series, the measure of risk aversion is given by the
frequency of choices where the decision maker picks the sure payoff instead of the lottery (in case of
consistent series, the same measure is obtained with the switching point). Figure 1 shows the empirical
distributions of safe choices in the three investment series concerned with individual money, separately
for women and men. Both for women and men, the distribution is more spread for the first series,
and some respondents appear extremely risk lovers. This may reflect the fact that one training series
was not enough and that some respondents answered randomly in the first series because they were
not acquainted with the task.
Figure 2 shows the empirical distributions of safe choices in the three investment series concerned
with couple money, separately for women, men and couples (spouses together). In all three investment
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Figure 1: Empirical distributions of safe choices, individual money.
series, the distribution of couple choices is more concentrated than the distribution of spouse choices.
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Figure 2: Empirical distributions of safe choices, couple money.
Both figures suggest that women are slightly more risk averse than men, and that men and women
answers are more heterogeneous than couples answers. This is confirmed in Table 3, which shows
the average frequencies of safe choices for the woman, the man and for the couple in the different
investment series, as well as their differences.
Concerning investment series 1 to 3 (individual money), women and men answers cannot be directly
compared since the amounts involved were generated randomly, independently for the woman and for
10
Investment Difference Difference Difference
series Woman Man Couple Woman-Couple Man-Couple Woman-Man
1 6.27 6.73 −0.50
(2.57) (2.18) (3.69)
2 8.23 7.36 0.86
(1.60) (1.68) (2.57)
3 6.59 6.77 −0.18
(1.89) (1.60) (2.34)
4/7 7.50 7.36 6.95 0.55 0.41 0.14
(1.87) (1.53) (1.09) (1.84) (1.37) (2.28)
5/8 7.86 7.59 7.73 0.14 −0.14 0.27
(2.03) (1.53) (1.16) (2.21) (1.49) (2.86)
6/9 7.45 7.36 7.27 0.18 0.09 0.09
(2.06) (1.89) (1.20) (1.92) (2.14) (3.00)
Table 3: Average frequencies of safe choices (standard deviations in parentheses).
the man. Table 3 supports the idea that individuals (especially women) answered more randomly in
series 1, since the average frequency of safe choices is lower15 and the standard deviations (of individual
answers and of their differences) are larger for series 1 than for series 2 and 3.
Concerning investment series 4 to 6 (couple money), women are (slightly) more risk averse than
men.16 Moreover, the average couple tends to be less risk averse than its average members (Munro,
Bateman, and McNally, 2008 reports a similar finding). Indeed, the average measure of risk aversion
for couples is systematically lower than the average measure of risk aversion for women and it is lower
than the average measure of risk aversion for men in 2 out of the 3 investment series. The variance
of the difference between men and women measures of risk aversion increases over time. The variance
of the difference between the couples and the men measures of risk aversion also increases over time
contrary to the variance of the difference between the couples and the women measures of risk aver-
sion which exhibits no monotonic pattern. In conclusion, after controlling for the average difference
between women, men and couples measures of risk aversion, the distance between couples and men
measures of risk aversion increases, whereas the distance between couples and women measures of risk
aversion remains constant. This suggests that the relative decision-making power of the woman when
the couple is facing a unique decision increases over time.
In the next section, we study the evolution of the balance of power within the household and we relate
our findings to the empirical/theoretical literature on intra-household decision-making.
15The average would be 5.5 for pure random choices, which is lower than the observed average of 7 to 8 for the other
series.
16Individual answers in investment series 4, 5 and 6 could reflect more the preferences of the couple than individual
answers in investment series 1, 2 and 3 since individuals invest the couple’s money. Our experimental data do not support
this argument. Indeed, the correlation factor between the average degree of risk aversion in Step 3 and the average degree
of risk aversion in Step 4 is highly positive for both spouses: It equals 0.682 for the woman and 0.574 for the man. These
correlation factors are at least as positive as those obtained when comparing the average degrees of risk aversion of
different investment series in the same step for a given spouse: In Step 3, the average correlation factor equals 0.419 for
the woman and 0.288 for the man; In Step 4, the average correlation factor equals 0.718 for the woman and 0.467 for
the man. On the contrary, correlation factors between the average degree of risk aversion of the woman and the average
degree of risk aversion of the man are either weakly positive or negative depending on the considered step(s): In Step 3
(respectively Step 4), the correlation factor between the average degrees of risk aversion of the two spouses equals -0.125
(respectively -0.148); The correlation factor between the average degree of risk aversion of the woman in Step 3 and the
average degree of risk aversion of the man in Step 4 equals -0.046; The correlation factor between the average degree of
risk aversion of the woman in Step 4 and the average degree of risk aversion of the man in Step 3 equals 0.118.
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3.2 The balance of power within the household
We now assume that the preferences of any decision maker in our sample can be represented by a
utility function with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) for money x > 0 (this choice is based
on initial tests for various standard utility functions). Decision maker k’s utility function is therefore
given by Vk(x) = V (x; θk) = (1− exp (−θk x)) /θk where θk is the level of absolute risk aversion. In
investment series j, the utility of the safe alternative Sj(i) is Vk (Sj(i)), while the expected utility of
the lottery is given by E [Vk (Lj)] = (Vk (Sj(1)) + Vk (Sj(11))) /2.
Experimental evidence suggests that stochastic variation is an essential feature of decision-making
behavior.17 Therefore, we assume that choices made by decision maker k in series j are consistent with
an absolute risk aversion level θ˜jk, a random variable modeled as θ˜jk = a+ µk + δj + εjk where a is a
constant term equal across series and decision makers, µk is an decision maker-specific term with zero
mean, δj measures potential systematic deviations specific to series j and εjk is a normal error term
with zero mean and variance specific to series j. The variance of µk +εjk is denoted by σ2j . We employ
an interval regression method to estimate the absolute risk aversion levels. With a normal distribution,
we obtain an unbiased estimate θˆjk of θ˜jk which in turn enables us to compute an unbiased estimate of
θk. Average individual risk aversion levels are based on the weighted mean of the absolute risk aversions
estimated for each of the first six investment series: θˆk =
∑6
j=1
((
θˆjk − δˆj
)
/σˆj
)
/
∑6
j=1 (1/σˆj). The
weights, inversely proportional to the estimated standard deviation of the residuals, improve the
efficiency of the estimate when the variance of the residuals varies across series.
To study the evolution of the balance of power within the household, we use the individual risk
aversions estimated from choices made in the first section of the experiment to explain the couple
risk aversions estimated from choices made in the second section of the experiment. Concretely, we
regress the couple CARA level on the respective spouses weighted average CARA levels for the dif-
ferent investment series of the second section of the experiment. Regressions are conducted on the
entire sample (Case 1) and on the restricted sample composed of couples in which women ultimately
implemented the joint decisions (Case 2). Our regression results, for each investment series of the
second section of the experiment, are displayed in Table 4 where in columns “Joint” we report the
χ2-statistic of the likelihood test for the null hypothesis that both coefficients are zero.18
According to the regression results for Case 1, neither the man nor the woman weighted average
CARA level significantly influences the couple CARA level in the seventh investment series. This
observation suggests that spouses needed to acquire some experience in making investment choices
jointly. The influence of the man risk aversion on the couple risk aversion is highly significant in
investment series 8, it becomes significant in investment series 9 and 10, and it is non-significant in the
last two investment series. On the contrary, the influence of the woman risk aversion on the couple
risk aversion is not significant in investment series 8 but it is significant in investment series 9, 10 and
11. These observations indicate that women gain more and more power over the course of decision
making to the detriment of men.
The balance of power within the household evolves even more clearly in couples where women
ultimately implement the joint decisions. According to the regression results for Case 3, the influence of
17In controlled experiments in which subjects have confronted exactly the same choice problem on two occasions the
proportion of choice reversals is between 10 and 30 per cent. See Table 1 in Stott (2006, p. 105).
18In the table we report separate regressions for the different investment series. Running a single regression on
the pooled data with interaction terms between investment series and individual measures of risk aversion produces
qualitatively equivalent results.
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Case 1 (22 couples) Case 2 (17 couples)
Series Woman Man Joint Woman=UC Man=No UC Joint
7 0.13 0.20 3.77 0.22 0.19 4.32
(0.14) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11)
8 0.03 0.25N 8.41M 0.07 0.24N 8.52M
(0.55) (0.00) (0.02) (0.34) (0.01) (0.02)
9 0.24M 0.40M 8.94M 0.34∗ 0.35∗ 6.69M
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
10 0.34M 0.56M 8.10M 0.93N 0.32∗ 18.06N
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00)
11 0.27M 0.21 4.16 0.66N 0.01 12.11N
(0.05) (0.31) (0.13) (0.00) (0.97) (0.00)
12 0.11 0.14 2.72 0.24M 0.07 3.86
(0.16) (0.26) (0.26) (0.05) (0.63) (0.15)
Notes: N, M, ∗ indicate significance at 1−, 5−, and 10−percent level, respectively.
Two-sided p-values in parentheses.
Table 4: Regression of the couple CARA level on the individual weighted average CARA levels.
the man risk aversion on the couple risk aversion is highly significant in investment series 8, it becomes
weakly significant in investment series 9 and 10, and it is non-significant in the last two investment
series. On the contrary, the influence of the woman risk aversion on the couple risk aversion is not
significant in investment series 8, it is weakly significant in investment series 9, it becomes highly
significant in investment series 10 and 11, and it is still significant in the last investment series.
Additionally, the marginal impact of the woman risk aversion is identical to the marginal impact of
the man risk aversion in investment series 9 (where both are weakly significant) but it is three times
higher in investment series 10 (where the man risk aversion is weakly significant and the woman risk
aversion is highly significant). Finally, the marginal impact of the woman risk aversion decreases in
the last two investment series (where the man risk aversion is not significant).19
Our estimation results suggest that in most couples men have, initially, a stronger decision-making
power than women. This observation is in line with earlier studies which show that men tend to
have more say in economic decision making and readier access to financial resources than their wives
(e.g. Pahl, 1995; Kirchler, Rodler, Holzl, and Meier, 2001). More surprisingly, our estimation results
also suggest that, far from being fixed, decision-making powers are malleable. Women who ultimately
implement the joint decisions gain more and more decision-making power over the course of an exper-
imental session.20 Our evidence on the malleability of the balance of power within the household is
clearly at odds with the collective approach based on static models of intra-household resource alloca-
tion that obeys a Pareto-efficient sharing rule. However, recent extensions of the collective approach
to intertemporal settings where the assumption of intra-household commitment is relaxed allow for
temporal variations in relative decision-making power (see, e.g., Mazzocco, 2007). In a more drastic
departure from the early collective approach, Basu (2006) discusses a model of household behaviour
under no-commitment where Pareto weights depend on choices variables. Consequently, the Pareto
weight assigned to each spouse is endogenous to the household decision-making process i.e. the house-
hold balance of power is endogenously determined. The assumption of an endogenous intra-household
19Regressing the couple safe choices on the individual safe choices leads to similar results for the subset of investment
series where the couple and individual choices can be directly compared. See Table 6 in the Appendix.
20Note that we do not argue that women gain more decision-making power only because they ultimately implement
the joint decisions, as it could well be that women ultimately implement the joint decisions because they initially have
substantial decision-making power. We do, however, believe that there is a relative gain in decision-making power
obtained by the spouse who ultimately implements the couple decisions.
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balance of power has received empirical support by Lancaster, Maitra, and Ray (2006) whose find-
ings using household-level unit record datasets from India indicate that decision-making powers are
determined jointly with the expenditure outcomes.
Though these recent extensions of the collective approach assume that intra-household allocations
influence the balance of power within the household, they are not fully consistent with our experimen-
tal results since they predict that household decisions shape relative decision-making power gradually.
On the contrary, we observe that power patterns within the household vary quickly which suggests
that the household decision process heavily depends on the context. This observation might cause
discomfort to economists but it is fully in line with the social-exchange formulation of family power
dynamics in social psychology and recent evidence from the marketing literature. According to the
social-exchange perspective, decision-making power resides in the characteristics of relationships and
not in personal traits which implies that power patterns within families will vary from time to time
and with task characteristics (Beckman-Brindley and Tavormina, 1978). Su, Fern, and Ye (2003) ex-
amine the dynamics of spousal behavioral interactions in a questionnaire study based on a sequence of
family purchase decisions. Their results suggest that spousal purchase-decision processes are adaptive.
In early purchase episodes, few spouses are willing to yield when faced with coercion while, in latter
purchase episodes, spouses get their way by using strong means of influence. The authors speculate
that there is a learning curve underlying the spousal decision-behavior dynamics.
Before concluding, we provide in the next section a quantitative analysis of the couples discussions
which corroborates our previous analyses of the choice data.21
4 Quantitative analysis of the discussions within the couple
In this section, we present a basic quantitative analysis of the discussions that couples had while
answering investment series 7 to 12 (a content analysis is beyond the scope of the present study).
Two undergraduate native raters independently watched the videos of 17 couples several times and
evaluated the talk duration of each spouse, i.e., the amount of time spent by each spouse talking to
the other spouse about which joint decision to implement.22 Both raters were instructed to exclude
from talk duration the amount of time spent by each spouse discussing topics not closely related to
the experiment. Table 5 shows the individual talk durations per investment series as well as the ratio
between the Woman Talk Duration (WTD) and the Couple Talk Duration (CTD) for each of the 17
couples.
In all couples expect two, the man was always arguing more about which joint decision to implement
than the woman. Unsurprisingly, both spouses talk on average more in the seventh investment series
than in the latter investment series. Though there is no clear time trend in women talk durations,
men argue on average more in the first three investment series than in the last three investments
series. It seems natural to relate the talk duration of an individual with his/her decision-making
power: the more an individual is arguing the more he/she is trying to influence the joint decision
(and, in most cases, he/she will probably be successful). In this respect, our quantitative analysis
of the couples discussions corroborates our statistical analyses of the choice data: the man leads the
joint decision, at least initially. Our previous analyses also suggested that the woman who ultimately
21Verbal frequency measures constitute the main quantitative process measures to study family interactions in psy-
chology. See, e.g., Jacob (1975) and the references therein.
22Unfortunately, five out of the 22 videos had to be discarded because of the low sound quality.
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Investment series
Session Cabin Spouse 7 8 9 10 11 12 Total WTD/CTD
January 24, 2005 Man 45 40 28 35 43 25 216
1 0.388
7 pm Woman 35 30 20 10 23 19 137
January 24, 2005 Man 55 60 60 34 38 23 270
2 0.338
7 pm Woman 40 25 18 15 29 11 138
January 25, 2005 Man 29 19 11 10 24 25 118
1 0.433
7 pm Woman 20 13 12 6 24 15 90
January 25, 2005 Man 44 33 50 27 37 12 203
2 0.450
7 pm Woman 23 18 49 17 44 15 166
January 25, 2005 Man 44 38 36 14 20 37 189
3 0.357
7 pm Woman 20 14 11 6 20 34 105
January 25, 2005 Man 8 18 26 17 28 8 105
4 0.521
7 pm Woman 16 14 17 23 28 16 114
January 26, 2005 Man 25 20 22 30 31 36 164
1 0.416
7 pm Woman 20 9 21 20 21 26 117
January 26, 2005 Man 52 13 29 30 20 8 152
2 0.290
7 pm Woman 26 8 5 6 11 6 62
January 26, 2005 Man 4 3 7 3 31 17 65
3 0.356
7 pm Woman 3 8 4 4 6 11 36
January 27, 2005 Man 13 9 11 14 21 10 78
2 0.447
7 pm Woman 13 7 7 9 14 13 63
January 27, 2005 Man 70 51 42 43 34 28 268
3 0.396
7 pm Woman 46 25 14 32 42 17 176
January 28, 2005 Man 51 44 21 19 19 31 185
1 0.387
7 pm Woman 26 19 24 15 18 15 117
January 28, 2005 Man 24 34 25 24 34 25 166
2 0.362
7 pm Woman 24 6 17 23 11 13 94
February 19, 2005 Man 38 11 13 16 20 29 127
1 0.392
3 pm Woman 24 8 10 12 9 19 82
February 19, 2005 Man 48 30 22 30 30 35 195
2 0.449
3 pm Woman 36 34 18 27 19 25 159
February 19, 2005 Man 42 20 8 3 6 10 89
3 0.429
3 pm Woman 20 7 11 8 5 16 67
February 19, 2005 Man 20 18 10 6 28 20 102
2 0.512
5 pm Woman 23 16 12 7 34 15 107
Note: WTD/CTD denotes the ratio between the Woman Talk Duration and the Couple Talk Duration.
Table 5: Individual talk durations in seconds.
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implements the joint decisions gains power over the course of decision-making to the detriment of the
man. We offer now a final evaluation of the impact of ultimate control on the evolution of power
balance by comparing the woman relative talk duration when she has ultimate control to her relative
talk duration when the man has ultimate control. Figure 3 shows the woman relative talk duration in
each investment series averaged, on the one hand, over the 13 couples where the woman had ultimate
control and averaged, on the other hand, over the 4 couples where the man had ultimate control.
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Figure 3: Woman relative talk duration.
In the seventh investment series, whether the woman has ultimate control or not does not influence
her talk duration. However, in investment series 8 and 9, a woman without ultimate control argues,
in relative terms, much more than a woman who has ultimate control. A similar tendency is observed
in the last part of the experimental session, i.e., in investment series 10 to 12. Under the natural
assumption that talk duration is related to decision-making power, we again conclude that the spouse
who has ultimate control gains additional influence on the decision of the couple.
5 Concluding comments
This article reports results on individual and couple choices in an experiment involving risk. Individuals
and couples make binary choices between a lottery and a sure payoff. In the first part of the experiment
spouses are separated and choose independently. Individual choices express individual risk preferences.
In the second part of the experiment male spouses rejoin their partner and they make joint choices.
In most cases, the woman implemented the couple choices which express collective risk preferences.
We investigate the evolution of the balance of power within the household by using the individual
risk aversions estimated from choices made in the first section of the experiment to explain the couple
risk aversions estimated from choices made in the second section of the experiment. We find that the
man is initially more successful than the woman in influencing couple choices but that the woman
progressively gains power over the course of decision-making and we speculate that part of this power
increase relates to the ultimate control over the implementation of joint choices.
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Our evidence on the dynamics of power balance suggests that actual decision processes within
the household are adaptive and depend on the context. This finding contradicts the early collective
approach based on static models of intra-household resource allocation according to which the decision-
making powers are regarded as exogenous to the household decision-making process. It is, however,
compatible with recent extensions of the collective approach which assume that intra-household allo-
cations influence the balance of power within the household. More research on larger samples would
be necessary in order to validate this preliminary finding. Similarly, larger samples would be necessary
in order to link stated and revealed decision-making power to distribution factors (such as difference
between spouses educational levels, ages or assets).
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Appendix: Dynamics of power balance in the ordinal approach
Contrary to the regression results reported in Table 4, the regression results reported in the table
below are based on a subset of the observed choices, namely the individual choices made in investment
series 4 to 6 (Step 4) and the couple choices made in investment series 7 to 9 (Step 5).
Case 1 (22 couples) Case 2 (17 couples)
Series Woman Man Adjusted R2 Woman=UC Man=No UC Adjusted R2
7 0.15 0.33M 0.24 0.25 0.34M 0.36
(0.19) (0.03) (0.12) (0.03)
8 0.15 0.37M 0.15 0.38N 0.41N 0.50
(0.23) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
9 0.25M 0.11 0.11 0.29∗ 0.07 0.07
(0.05) (0.43) (0.10) (0.70)
Notes: N, M, ∗ indicate significance at 1−, 5−, and 10−percent level, respectively.
Two-sided p-values in parentheses.
Table 6: Regression of couple safe choices on individual safe choices.
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